Dīrghāgama 21

The Net of Brahmā

Talk on Wanderers

Thus have I heard. The Buddha once, when going on a tour through Magadha country with a great company of monks, with about one thousand and two hundred fifty monks, arrived at Veluvana. And there he put up at the royal rest-house to pass the night.

Now at the same time, there was a wanderer named Suppiya. The youth Brahmādatta was his pupil. Both teacher and pupil always went together, followed step by step after the Buddha and the company of monks. But, while the wanderer Suppiya spoke in many ways in dispraise of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha, his pupil, the youth Brahmādatta spoke in many ways in praise of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha. So do these two, teacher and pupil, follow step by step after the Buddha, making assertions in direct contradiction to one another. Why is it so? This is because that they have different views, follow different discipline, and have different association with different people.

Now, a number of monks, after begging for alms, assembled in the hall and this was the trend of their talk: “It is wonderful and marvelous, how the Exalted One, he who has miraculous power and full of respect-inspiring virtue, has so thoroughly penetrated the diversity in the dispositions of beings. For this wanderer Suppiya spoke in many ways in dispraise of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha, while his pupil, the youth Brahmādatta spoke in many ways in praise of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha. So do these two, teacher and pupil, follow step by step after the Buddha and the company of monks, making assertions in direct contradiction to one another. This is because they have different views, follow different discipline, and have different association with different people.”

Now the Blessed One in the abode of meditation, on hearing what was the drift of their talk through the divine ear which is superior to human ear, rose up from meditation, and went to the preaching hall; and there he took his seat in front of monks. Although, being aware of what those monks were talking, the Buddha deliberately asked: “O, monks. What was the reason that caused all of you to gather here in this hall? What was the subject of your conversation?”

Then the bhiksus replied: “After begging our alms, we assembled in this preaching hall. As we sat here, the following conversation sprang up among us: ‘It is wonderful and marvelous, how the Tathagata, who has miraculous power and full of respect-inspiring virtue, has so thoroughly penetrated the diversity in the dispositions of beings. For this wanderer Suppiya spoke in many ways in dispraise of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha, while his pupil, the youth Brahmādatta, spoke in many ways in praise of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha. So do these two, teacher and pupil, follow step by step after the Buddha and the company of monks, making assertions in direct contradiction to one another. Why is it so? This is because they have different views, different habits, and different association with different people.’ That is why we have gathered here in this preaching hall in order to discuss such a thing.”

Then the Buddha told bhiksus: “O, monks. If anyone, in as many ways, should speak in dispraise of me, of the Dharma, or of the Sangha, you should not give way to resentment, displeasure, or animosity against them in your heart. Why? For if you were to become angry or upset in such a situation, you would only be standing in the way of your self-conquest. Therefore, you should not give way to resentment, displeasure, or animosity against them in your heart.

And if, monks, others speak in praise of me, or in praise of the Dharma, or in praise of the Sangha, you should not give way to jubilation, joy, and exultation in your heart. Why? For if you were to become jubilant, joyful, and exultant in such a situation, you would only be standing in the way of your self-conquest. Therefore, you should not give way to jubilation, joy, and exultation in your heart. Why? It is only to trifling and insignificant matters, to the minor details of mere moral virtue, that the worldling who knows too little to comprehend their deep and subtle meanings would refer when speaking in accordance with what he has directly seen through his eyes in praise of the Tathagata.

The Analysis of Virtue

1) The Short Section on Virtue

And what are those trifling and insignificant matters, those minor details of mere moral virtue, to which the worldling who knows too little to comprehend their deep and subtle meanings would refer when speaking in accordance with what he has directly seen through his eyes in praise of the Tathagata?

He might praise:

Having abandoned the destruction of life, the recluse Gautama abstains from the destruction of life. He has laid aside the cudgel and the sword, and is ashamed of roughness, and full of mercy, he dwells compassionately and kind to all creatures that have life.’ These are the trifling and insignificant matters, the minor details of mere moral virtue. It is in this way, that the worldling would speak when speaking in praise of the Tathagata.

Or he might praise:

Having abandoned taking what is not been given, the recluse Gautama abstains from taking what is not given. He dwells in without conceiving any idea of stealing, but honesty and rectitude of heart.’

Or he might praise:

Having abandoned unchaste living, the recluse Gautama lives the life of chastity. He observes the precepts all the way, holds himself aloof, far off, from the vulgar practice, from sexual act. Whatever he practices is on the way of chastity.’

Or he might praise:

Having abandoned false speech, the recluse Gautama abstains from falsehood. Whatever he speaks is in accordance with the truth, from the truth he never swerves; faithful and trustworthy, he does not deceive anyone in the world.’

(Or he might praise:)

Having abandoned slander, the recluse Gautama abstains from slander. What he hears here he repeats not elsewhere to raise quarrel against the people here; what he hears elsewhere he repeats not here to raise a quarrel against the people there. He makes those who are in dispute together, and increases happiness among those who are friends. He only speaks words that are conducive to concord, peace and unity. He utters to the masses only when time is ripe. People are deeply being touched by his honesty by heart.’

(Or he might praise:)

Having abandoned harsh speech, the recluse Gautama abstains from harsh speech. Whatsoever words are harmful to others, increasing hatred among the people—such are words he does not speak; whatsoever words are blameless, pleasant to ear, lovely, reaching to the heart, urbane, pleasing to the manyfolk—such are words he speaks.’

(Or he might praise:)

Having abandoned idle chatter, the recluse Gautama abstains from idle chatter. He speaks at the right time, speaks what is factual, speaks on the good, on the Dharma, on the Discipline, and on preventing evil deeds—such are words he speaks.’

(Or he might praise:)

Having abandoned alcoholic drinks, the recluse Gautama abstains from alcoholic drinks.

He abstains from wearing, adorning, or ornamenting himself with garlands, scents.

He abstains from being a spectator at shows at fairs, with nautch dances and singing.

He abstains from the use of large and lofty beds.

He abstains from eating at improper times.

He abstains from accepting gold and silver.

He abstains from accepting women and girls, bondsmen and bondwomen.

He abstains from accepting elephants, horses and mares, pigs, goats and sheep, chicken, dogs, as well as other fowls and beasts.

He abstains from accepting fourfold army—elephant, horse, chariot and infantry.

He abstains from accepting cultivated fields and houses, and from planting five kinds of cereal crop.

He abstains from beating, or maiming others with hands or fists.

He abstains from the crooked ways of deception and fraud, and from dealing with false scales and false measures.

He abstains from trafficking in bond or contract, and from engaging in pawnshop.

He abstains from getting into debt which creates a lot of problems and contradictions.

He abstains from plotting against others and overtly agreeing but covertly opposing.

He abstains from going out at improper times.

‘He takes his food moderately according to the need of the stomach in order to nourish his physical body and prolong life.

Wherever he goes, he carries robs and alms-bowl with him, just like flying bird wherever it flies, it carries with its feathers and wings.

This is the short section on virtue. It is in this way that the worldling would speak when speaking in praise of the Tathagata.”

2) The Intermediate Section on Virtue

(Or he might say:) ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, continue addicted to the use of stored up things, such as stored up garments, food, and drinks, without being satisfied—the recluse Gautama refrains from the use of stored up things.

(Or he might say:) ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, engage in business, tree planting, and take refuge in tree-spirits—the recluse Gautama refrains from engaging in such a business.

(Or he might say:) ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, continue addicted to the use of high and large beds adorned with ivory, and variegated gems, fleecy or variegated coverlets, quilts, and carpets, embroidered with various figures, such as: Qu (氍), Lu (氀), Ta (毾), Deng (覴), Wen (綩), and Yan (綖)—the recluse Gautama refrains from such high and large beds.

Or he might say: ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, enjoy the use of such devices for embellishing and beautifying themselves as the following: massaging with oils, bathing in perfumed water, rubbing scented powders into the body, combing hair with cosmetics, wearing garlands, using eye-ointments, face-powders, make-up, bracelets, necklace, mirrors, gems, leather shoes, long-fringed white robs, turbans, sunshades, and yak-tail whisks—the recluse Gautama refrains from the use of such devices for embellishment and beautification.

Or he might say: ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, indulge in various games and recreations, such as: a game played on an eight-row chess board; a game played on a ten-row chess board, as well as a game played on a hundred-row chess board or on a thousand-row chess board, and so on—the recluse Gautama refrains from such games and recreations.

Or he might say: ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, engage in frivolous and unwholesome chatter, such as: talk about kings, wars, armies, and military-horses; talk about ministers of state, and governmental officials, whether they are going in vehicles or riding on horses to visit gardens and parks; talk about beds, trips, and women; talk about garments, food, drink, relations, and villages; talk about collecting treasures from the sea—the recluse Gautama abstains from such frivolous and unwholesome chatter.

Or he might say: ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, continue addicted to the practice of wrong means of livelihood by either flattery or slander, and are always on the make for further gains—the recluse Gautama holds aloof from such wrong means of practice.

Or he might say: ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, engage in wrangling argumentation, saying to one another in the garden, in the bathing pond, or in the preaching hall, such as:

You don’t understand this doctrine and discipline. It is I who understand this doctrine and discipline.”

You are following the heretical (wrong) path. I am following the right path.”

What should have been put first you put last, what should have been put last you put first.”

You cannot be patient. I can be patient.”

What you say is incorrect. If you have some doubts on something, you come and ask me. I can answer any of your question.” —the recluse Gautama abstains from such wrangling argumentation.’

Or he might say: ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, engage in running messages and errands for kings, ministers of state, brahmins, and householders, (who command them): “Go here, go there, take this there, bring that from there”. Or do those by themselves, or ask someone to do those for them—the recluse Gautama abstains from running such messages and errands.’

Or he might say: ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, indulge in the following plays and recreations: practising sham-battles, debate, bow-arrow, sword; or combats of cocks, dogs, pigs, goats, rams, elephants, horses, buffaloes, bulls, and camel; or combats of men and women; or shouting together, trumpeting, drumming, singing, and dancing, or as any play as they wish—the recluse Gautama holds aloof from such crazy plays and recreations.’

The Long Section on Virtue

Or he might say: ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, earn their living by a wrong means of livelihood, by such debased arts, such as: divining whether a man or woman is well born, lucky or unlucky, or divining animals, and are always in the make for the further gains—the recluse Gautama abstains from such wrong means of livelihood, from such debased arts.’

Or he might say: ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, earn their living by wrong means of livelihood, by various debased arts which make people either frightful or exciting; either concord or discord; either happy or suffering, such as: using charms to call ghosts, demons, or spirits to come, or scaring away of them; rejuvenating fetuses of abortive women, or procuring abortions; reciting charms to make people to be donkeys and horses; or bringing on deafness, blindness, and dumbness; showing whatever they can, such as extending the joined hands towards the sun, pursuing gain with gain by mortification—the recluse Gautama abstains from such wrong means of livelihood, from such debased arts.’

Or he might say: ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, earn their living by a wrong means of livelihood, by such debased arts, such as: using charms to make people ill; or reciting evil charms, or reciting good charms; or administering medicines and acupuncture to cure bodily diseases—the recluse Gautama abstains from such wrong means of livelihood, from such debased arts.’

Or he might say: ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, earn their living by a wrong means of livelihood, by such debased arts as: reciting spells of bringing flood and fire; or reciting spells of spirits and ghosts; or reciting spells of ksatriya; or reciting spells of elephants; or reciting spells of knuckles; or reciting spells to cause virility or impotence; or reciting spells while lodging in a house; or reciting spells which can dispel mischief by burning the cloth gnawed by mice; or prophesying birth and death; or interpreting ominous dreams; prophesying long life, prosperity, etc., or the reverse, from the marks on a person’s palms and faces; or reciting spells to speculate about the world; or reciting spells to understand all kinds of voice and sound—the recluse Gautama abstains from such wrong means of livelihood, from such debased arts.’

Or he might say: ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, earn their living by a wrong means of livelihood, by such debased arts as predicting: there will be abundant rainfall; there will be deficient rainfall; there will be a good harvest; there will be scarcity of food; there will be sickness; there will be health; there will be security; there will be danger; or predicting that there will be an earthquake; there will be a comet; there will be an eclipse of the moon; there will be an eclipse of the sun; there will be an eclipse of a star, or there will be no any eclipse; they predict whatever they can in various fields—the recluse Gautama abstains from such wrong means of livelihood, from such debased arts.’

Or he might say: ‘Whereas some recluses and Brahmāns, while living on food offered by the faithful, earn their living by a wrong means of livelihood, by such debased arts as making predictions to the effect that: this country will be victorious and that country will be defeated; or that country will be victory and this country will be defeated; or there will be a luck or ill-luck; or there will be a prosperity or decline in the country—the recluse Gautama abstains from such wrong means of livelihood, from such debased arts.’ 

These, monks monks, are those trifling insignificant matters, those minor details of mere moral virtue, that a worldling would refer when speaking in praise of the Tathagata.”

3. The Sixty-two Kinds of Wrong Views

There are, monks, other dharmas, deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise, (which the Tathagata, having realized for himself with direct knowledge, proclaims to others), and it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathagata in accordance with reality would speak. And what are these dharmas, deep, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise, and about which the wise disciple would rightly praise the Tathagata in accordance with reality would speak?

There are some recluses and Brahmāns (who are speculators about the past and the future), who hold settled views about the past and the future, and who on sixty-two grounds assert various conceptual theorems referring to the past and the future. All the conceptual theorems about the past and the future are included in these sixty-two grounds of views. And owing to what, with reference to what, do these recluses and Brahmāns frame their speculations?”

1) Speculations about the Past

There are some recluses and Brahmāns who are speculators about the past, who hold settled views about the past, and who on eighteen grounds assert various conceptual theorems referring to the past. All these conceptual theorems about the past are included in these eighteen grounds of views. And owing to what, with reference to what, do these recluses and Brahmāns frame their speculations?”

(1) Eternalism: Views 1–4

There are some recluses and Brahmāns who are eternalists, and who on four grounds proclaim that both the self and the world are eternal. And owing to what, with reference to what, do these recluses and Brahmāns proclaim their views?

Therein, some recluse or Brahmān has by various means, attained to such a degree of mental concentration that with his mind thus concentrated, he thereby recollects numerous past lives throughout twenty aeons of world evolution and dissolution. And he says: ‘The self and the world are eternal, steadfast, barren. And though these beings roam and wander through the round of existence, pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remains the same just like eternity itself. Why so? Because I, by various means, (as of endeavour, diligence, etc.) attained to such a state of mental concentration that I have thereby recalled numerous past lives throughout twenty aeons of world evolution and dissolution. And though beings roam and wander through the round of existence, pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remain the same just like eternity itself. For this I know that the self and the world are eternal.’ This is the first case. It is, on account of which, the one of four grounds, not outside of these, some recluses and Brahmāns who hold settled views about the past, maintain that both the self and the world are eternal.

Herein, some recluse or Brahmān, by various means, (as of endeavour and diligence, etc.) attains to such a state of mental concentration that with his mind thus concentrated he recollects his numerous past lives throughout forty aeons of world evolution and dissolution. And he says: ‘The self and the world are eternal, barren, steadfast. And though these beings roam and wander through the round of existence, pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remains the same just like eternity itself. Why so? Because I, by various means, (as of endeavour, diligence, etc.) attained to such a state of mental concentration that I have thereby recalled numerous past lives throughout forty aeons of world evolution and dissolution. And though beings roam and wander through the round of existence, pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remains the same just like eternity itself. For this I know that the self and the world are eternal.’ This is the second case. It is on account of which, the one of four grounds, not outside of these, some recluses and Brahmāns who hold settled views about the past, proclaim that the self and the world are eternal.

Herein, some recluse or Brahmān, by various means, (as of endeavour and diligence, etc.) attains to such state of mental concentration that which his mind thus concentrated he recollects his numerous past lives throughout eighty aeons of world evolution and dissolution. And he says: ‘The self and the world are eternal, barren, steadfast. And though these beings roam and wander through the round of existence, pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remain the same just like eternity itself. Why so? Because I, by various means, (as of endeavour and diligence, etc.) attained to such state of mental concentration that I have hereby recalled numerous past lives throughout eighty aeons of world evolution and dissolution. And though beings roam and wander through the round of existence, pass away and re-arise, yet the self and the world remain the same just like eternity itself. For this I know that the self and the world are eternal.’ This is the third case. It is on account of which, the one of four grounds, not outside of these, some recluses and Brahmāns who hold settled views about the past, proclaim that the self and the world are eternal.

Herein, some recluse or Brahmān who is sharp-witted, quick in thought and good at logic and reasoning. Hammering out by reason, deducing from his investigations, following his own flight of thought, he declares his view thus: ‘The self and the world are eternal.’ This is the fourth case. It is on account of which, the one of four grounds, not outside of these, some recluses and Brahmāns who are eternalists proclaim that the self and the world to be eternal.

It is on these four grounds that those recluses and Brahmāns who are eternalists proclaim the self and the world to be eternal. Whatever recluses and Brahmāns proclaim the eternity of the self and the world, all of them do so on these four grounds, or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none.

This, only the Tathagata understands: These viewpoints, thus grasped and such adhered to, lead to such a future destination, to such a state in the world beyond. He understands as well what transcends this, yet even that understanding he is not attached to. And being thus unattached he has realized within himself the state of perfect peace, and having understood as they really are the arising and passing away of feelings, their sweet taste, their danger, and the escape from them, the Tathagata is liberated through non-clinging.

These, monks, are those dharmas, that are profound, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise; and it is concerning these that the wise disciple would rightly praise the Tathagata in accordance with the truth would speak.”

(2) Partial Eternalism: Views 5–8

There are other dharmas, profound, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise; and it is concerning these that the wise disciple would rightly praise the Tathagata in accordance with the truth would speak. And what are these dharmas?

There are some recluses and Brahmāns who are eternalists in regard to some things, and non-eternalists in regard to other things, and who on four grounds proclaim the self and the world to be partly eternal and partly non-eternal. It is in this way, the one of four grounds, that some recluses and Brahmāns who are eternalists in regard to some things, and non-eternalists in regard to other things, proclaim the self and the world to be partly eternal and partly non-eternal.

There comes a time, sooner or later after the lapse of a long period, when this world-system begins to expand, a certain being, due to the exhaustion of his blessing, the exhaustion of his life-span, or the exhaustion of his merit, passes away from the Heaven of Streaming Radiance and re-arises in the empty Palace of Brahmā. There he alone dwells.

Then, as a result of dwelling there all alone for so long a time, there arises in him, a dissatisfaction and a longing. So he makes a wish: ‘O! would that other beings might come to join me in this place!’ And just then, either because of their span of life had passed or their merit was exhausted, other beings pass away from the Heaven of Streaming Radiance and re-arise in the empty palace of Brahmā as companions to him. And then, the being who was first reborn thinks thus to himself: ‘I am Brahmā, the Great Brahmā here in this place. I came into existence without rhyme or reason. There is no one who can create me. I am the Universal Seer, the All-seeing, the Almighty. I am God, the Supreme One, the subtle Maker, the Creator, and the father of all that are and are to be. I am the one who came into existence first. All these beings re-arose here after me. And these beings who re-arose here later all have been created by me.’

And the beings who re-arose there after him also think: ‘He is the Great Brahmā. He himself can create; and there is no one who can create him. He is the Universal Seer, the All-seeing, the Almighty. He is God, the Supreme Being, the subtle Maker and Creator. He is the father of all of us. He is the only one who came into existence first. We all came after him; and we all were created by him.’

Now, this comes to pass, that a certain being, due to exhaustion of his life-span or the exhaustion of merit, passes away from that world and takes rebirth in this world. After growing up, he shaves his head and puts on robes, thus goes forth from household life into homelessness. When he has gone forth, by means of endeavour and diligence, etc., he attains to such a state of mental concentration that with his mind thus concentrated he recollects his immediately preceding life. He speaks thus: ‘The Great Brahmā who can create himself, and there is no one who can create him. He is the Almighty, the All-seeing, the Universal Seer, God, the Supreme Being, the Subtle Maker, the Creator, and the Father of all beings. He is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and he will remain the same just like eternity itself. But we who have been created by him and have come hither as being impermanent, unstable, doomed to perish, short-lived.’ That’s why we know that the self and the world are partly eternal and partly non-eternal. This (the Great Brahmā) is permanent, eternal, stable, and all others are impermanent, unstable.’ This is the first case. It is in this way, on the one of four grounds, that some recluses and Brahmāns who hold a settled view about the past, proclaim the self and the world to be partly eternal and partly non-eternal.

There are certain gods called “corrupted by pleasures.” For ages they pass their time in the pursuit of laughter and sport of sensual lust. As a consequence they become weary in their body and then lose their self-control. When they lose their self-control, they pass away from that plane and take rebirth in this world.

After growing up, he shaves his head and puts on robes, thus goes forth from the household life into homelessness. When he has gone forth, by means of endeavour and diligence, etc., he attains to such a state of mental concentration that with his mind thus concentrated he recollects his immediately preceding life. He speaks thus: ‘Those gods who are not corrupted by pleasures do not spend an excessive time indulging in the delights of laughter and play. As a consequence they do not pass away from that plane, but remain there for ever and ever. Those gods are permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change. But we were gods corrupted by play. Because we spent an excessive time indulging in the delights of laughter and play, and as a consequence we are now impermanent, unstable, short-lived, doomed to perish. Therefore, I know that the self and the world are partly eternal and partly non-eternal. This (those who are not corrupted by play) is permanent, stable, eternal, and others (as we were corrupted by play) are impermanent, unstable, non-eternal.’ This is the second case. It is in this way, on the one of four grounds, those recluses and Brahmāns who are eternalists in regard to some things, and non-eternalists in regard to other things, proclaim the self and the world to be partly eternal and partly non-eternal.

There are certain gods contemplate on each other with excessive envy. As a consequence they lose their self-control, and when they lose their self-control they pass away from that plane and take rebirth in this world. After growing up, he shaves his head and puts on robes, thus goes forth from the household life into homelessness. When he has gone forth, by means of endeavour and diligence, etc., he attains to such a state of mental concentration that with his mind thus concentrated he recollects his immediately preceding life. He speaks thus: ‘Those gods who are not corrupted by mind do not contemplate on each other with excessive envy. As a result, they do not lose their self-control, and they do not pass away from that plane, but remain there for ever and ever. Those gods are permanent, stable, not subject to change. But we contemplated on each other with excessive envy, and as a result we lose our self-control, and consequently we passed away from that plane. Coming to this world, now we are impermanent, unstable, short-lived, doomed to perish. Owing to this, I know that the self and the world are partly eternal and partly non-eternal. This is eternal permanent, stable, and others are impermanent, unstable.’ This is the third case. It is in this way, on the one of four grounds, those recluses and Brahmāns proclaim that the self and the world to be partly eternal and partly non-eternal.

Herein, some recluse or Brahmān who is sharp-witted, quick in thought and good at logic and reasoning. Hammering out by reason, deducing from his investigations, following his own flight of thought, he declares his view thus: ‘The self and the world are partly eternal and partly non-eternal. They are permanent, steadfast, eternal, not subject to change, and others are impermanent, unstable, not eternal, subject to change.’ This is the fourth case. It is in this way, on the one of four grounds, that those recluses and Brahmāns proclaim the self and the world to be partly eternal and partly non-eternal.

It is on these four grounds, that those recluses and Brahmāns who are partial-eternalists proclaim the self and the world to be partly eternal and partly non-eternal. Whatever recluses and Brahmāns there may be who proclaim the self and the world to be partly eternal and partly non-eternal, all of them do so on these four grounds, or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none.

Only the Tathagata understands: ‘These standpoints, thus grasped and thus adhered to, will lead to such a future destination, to such a state in the world beyond. Tathagata understands as well what transcends this, yet even that understanding he does not attach to. And because he is free from attachment, he has realized within himself the state of perfect peace. Having understood as they really are the arising and passing away of feelings, their attraction and peril, and escape from them, the Tathagata is emancipated through non-clinging.

These are those dharmas, monks, that are profound, difficult to see, and difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise. And it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathagata in accordance with reality would speak.”

Doctrines of the Finitude and Infinity of the World: Views 9–12

There are, monks, other dharmas, profound, difficult to see, and difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise. And it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathagata in accordance with reality would speak. What are these dharmas?

There are, monks, some recluses and Brahmāns who are extensionists, and who hold settled views about the past, on four grounds proclaiming the self and the world to be finite or infinite. It is in this way, on the four grounds, that those recluses and Brahmāns who hold settled views about the past, proclaim the self and the world to be finite or infinite.

Some recluse or Brahmān, by various means, (as of endeavour, diligence, application, etc.) attains to such state of mental concentration that with his mind thus concentrated he abides perceiving the world as finite. He speaks thus: ‘The world is finite and bounded. This is true, and others are false views. What is the reason? Because I, by various means (as of endeavour, diligence, etc.) have attained to such a state of mental concentration that with my mind thus concentrated I abided perceiving the world as finite. For that reason I know this: the world is finite and bounded. This is true, and other sayings are false.’ This is the first case. It is in this way, on the one of four grounds, those recluses and Brahmāns who hold settled views about the past, proclaim the self and the world to be finite, bounded.

Therein, some recluse or Brahmān, by various means (as of endeavour, application, and diligence, etc.) attains to such a state of mental concentration that with his mind thus concentrated he abides perceiving the world as infinite. He speaks: ‘The world is infinite, and boundless. This is true, and other sayings are false. What is the reason? Because I, by various means (as of endeavour, application, and diligence, etc.), have attained to such a state of mental concentration that with my mind thus concentrated I abided perceiving the world as infinite. For this reason I know this: the world is infinite, and boundless. This is true, and other sayings are false.’ This is the second case. It is in this way, on the one of four grounds, that those recluses and Brahmāns who hold settled views about the past, proclaim the world to be infinite, and boundless.

Herein, some recluse or Brahmān, by various means (as of endeavour, application, and diligence, etc.), attains to such a state of mental concentration that with his mind thus concentrated he abides perceiving the world as finite in the upward and downward directions, but as infinite across. He speaks thus: ‘The world is both finite and infinite. This is true, and other sayings are false. What is the reason? Because I, by various means (as of endeavour, diligence, and application, etc.), have attained to such a state of mental concentration that with my mind thus concentrated I abided perceiving the world as finite in upward and downward directions, but as infinite across. For this reason I know this: the world is both finite and infinite. This is true, and other sayings are false.’ This is the third case. It is in this way, on the one of four grounds, that those recluses and Brahmāns who hold settled view about the past, proclaim the world to be both finite and infinite.

Herein, some recluse or Brahmān who is sharp-witted, quick in thought and good at logic and reasoning. Hammering out by reason, deducing from his investigations, following his own flight of thought, he declares thus: ‘The world is neither finite nor infinite. This is true, and other sayings are false.’ This is the fourth case.

It is on these four grounds, monks, that those recluses and brhmans who are extensionists proclaim the world to be finite or infinite. Whatever recluses and Brahmāns there may be who proclaim the world to be finite or infinite, all of them do so on these four grounds, or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is no way in which this opinion is arrived at.

This, monks, the Tathagata understands: These viewpoints thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. He understands as well what transcends this, yet even that understanding he does not attach to. And because he is free from attachment, he has realized within himself the state of perfect peace. Having understood as they really are the arising and passing away of feelings, their attraction and peril, and the escape from them, the Tathagata is emancipated through non-clinging.

These are those dharmas, profound, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise; and it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathagata in accordance with reality would speak.”

Doctrines of Endless Equivocation: Views 13–16

There are, monks, other dharmas, profound, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise; and it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathagata in accordance with reality would speak. And what are these dharmas?

There are some recluses and Brahmāns who wriggle like eels; and when a question is put to them on this or that they resort to equivocation, to eel-wriggling, and this in four ways. Therefore, some recluses and Brahmāns who wriggle like eels, resort to equivocation, to eel-wriggling on four grounds, when a question is put to them on this or that.

Therein, some recluse or Brahmāns makes thus a statement, holds thus a view: ‘I do neither see nor understand whether there will be a wholesome result after performing a wholesome action or there will be an unwholesome result after performing an unwholesome action. For I do neither see nor understand whether there will be a wholesome result after performing a wholesome action or there will be an unwholesome result after performing an unwholesome action, so that I thus say I do neither declare there will be a wholesome result after performing a wholesome action nor there will be an unwholesome result after performing an unwholesome action.’

There are some recluse or Brahmān who is erudite and well-heard, wise, clever, experienced in controversy, and respected by the world. He is good at distinguishing any viewpoint. He thinks: ‘when I be questioned about the profundity of this or that point, I might not be able to reply. If I could not reply, that would distress me, and that distress would be an obstacle for me. Therefore, out of fear and loathing of being distressed, I have to answer in this way, as my refuge, as my island, as my house, as my path of deliverance. So when someone put a question to me on this or that, I should answer like this: “I do not take it thus, nor do I take it in that way, nor do I take it in some other way. I do not say that it is not, nor do I say that is neither this nor that.” This is the first case. It is in this way, on the one of four grounds, that those recluses and Brahmāns resort to evasive statement and to endless equivocation, when questioned about this or that.

Therein some recluse or Brahmān makes thus a statement, holds thus a view: ‘I do neither see nor understand whether there is a world beyond or there is no such a world beyond.’ There are some recluse or Brahmān who can see things far beyond with his divine eye and read others mind, when I come close to him, he is not seen by me. Such a person understands whether there is a world beyond or there is no such a world beyond. But I do neither see nor understand whether there is a world beyond or there is no such a world beyond. If, without understanding, I were to declare there is to be a world beyond or there is to be no world beyond, my declaration might be false, that would distress me. Therefore, out of fear and loathing of making a false statement, I take this as my refuge, as my island, as my house, and as my path of deliverance. So, when someone puts a question to me on this or that, I should answer like this: ‘I do not take it thus, nor do I take it in that way, nor do I take it in some other way. I do not say that it is not, nor do I say that it is neither this nor that.’ This is the second case. It is in this way, on the one of the four grounds, that those recluses and Brahmāns resort to evasive statement and to the endless equivocation, when questioned about this or that.

Herein, some recluse or Brahmān makes thus a statement, holds thus a view: ‘I do not see or understand as it really is what is wholesome and what is unwholesome. If without seeing or understanding, I were to declare something to be wholesome or unwholesome, desire and lust or hatred and aversion might arise in me. Under these circumstances, desire and lust or hatred and aversion might cause a rebirth. In order to eliminate the pain of remorse, I go forth from the household life into the homelessness. Therefore, out of fear and loathing of the falling into that state, (he does not declare anything to be wholesome or unwholesome), he takes this as his refuge, as his island, as his house, and as his path of deliverance. But when some one puts a question to him on this or that, he resort to evasive statements and to endless equivocation, and he answers like this: ‘I do not take it thus, nor do I take it in that way, nor do I take it in some other way. I do not say that it is not, nor do I say that it is neither this nor that.’ This is the third case. It is in this way, on the one of four grounds, that those recluses and Brahmāns resort to evasive statements and to endless equivocation, when questioned about this or that.

Herein, some recluse or Brahmān is dull and stupid. Due to his dullness and stupidity, when he is questioned about this or that point, he does the same as others do—resorts to evasive statements and to endless equivocation: ‘I do not take it thus, nor do I take it in that way, nor do I take it in some other way. I do not say that it is not, nor do I say that it is neither this nor that.’ This is the fourth case. It is in this way, on the one of four grounds, that those recluses and Brahmāns resort evasive statements and to endless equivocation, when questioned about this or that.

It is on these four grounds, monks, that those recluses and Brahmāns who are endless equivocators resort to evasive statements and to endless equivocation when questioned about this or that point. Whatever recluses or Brahmāns there may be who resort to evasive statements and to endless equivocation, all of them do so on these four grounds, or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none.

This, monks, only the Tathagata understands: These view-points thus grasped and thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of these who trust in them. He understands as well what transcends this, yet even that understanding he does not attach to. And because he is free from attachment, he has realized within himself the state of perfect peace. Having understood as they really are the arising and passing away of feelings, their satisfaction, unsatisfactoriness, and the escape from them, the Tathagata is emancipated through non-clinging.

These are those dharmas, bhiksus, that are deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise; and it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathagata in accordance with reality would speak.”

Doctrines of Fortuitous Origination: Views 17–18

There are, monks, other dharmas, deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise; and it is concerning these that those who would rightly praise the Tathagata in accordance with reality would speak. And what are these dharmas?

There are some recluses and Brahmāns who are fortuitous originationists, and who on two grounds proclaim the world to originate fortuitously. Whatever those recluses or Brahmāns who are fortuitous originationists proclaim the world to originate fortuitously, all of them do so on these two grounds, or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none. And owing to what, with reference to what, do these recluses and Brahmāns proclaim the world to originate fortuitously, on two grounds?

There are, bhiksus, certain beings called ‘non-percipient beings.’ When perception arises in them, those beings pass away from that plane. Now, this comes to pass, that a certain being, after passing away from that plane, takes rebirth in this world. Having come to this world, he shaves his head and puts on robes; thus goes forth from the household life into homelessness after growing up (at a certain age). When he has gone forth, (by means of ardour, endeavour, application, and diligence etc.), he attains to such a degree of mental concentration that with his mind thus concentrated he recollects the arising of perception, but nothing previous to that. He speaks thus: ‘Previously I did not exist, I sprang into being—I came into existence (the self originated) fortuitously. Similarly, originally the world did not exist, the world originated fortuitously. This is true, and other sayings are false.’ This is the first case. It is in this way, on the one of the two grounds, that those recluses and Brahmāns who are fortuitous originationists proclaim the self and the world originate fortuitously.

Herein, monks, some recluse or Brahmān who is sharp-witted, quick in thought and good at logic and reasoning. Hammering out by reason, deducing from his investigations, following his own flight of thought, he declares his views thus: ‘The world originates fortuitously. This is true, and other sayings are false.’ This is the second case.

It is on these two grounds, monks, that those recluses and Brahmāns who are fortuitous originationists proclaim the world to originate fortuitously. Whatever recluses or Brahmāns there may be who proclaim the world to originate fortuitously, all of them do so on these two grounds, or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none.

This, monks, only the Tathagata understands: ‘These viewpoints, thus grasped, thus insisted on, well lead to such a future destination, to such a state in the world beyond.’ …

It is on these eighteen grounds, monks, that those recluses and brhmans who are speculators about the past and hold settled views about the past, assert various conceptual theorems referring to the past. Whatever recluses or Brahmāns are speculators about the past, hold settled views about the past, and assert various conceptual theorems referring to the past, all of them do so on these eighteen grounds, or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none.

This, monks, only the Tathagata understands: ‘These viewpoints, thus grasped and thus insisted on, will lead to such a future destination, to such a state in the world beyond.’

2) Speculations about the Future

There are, monks, some other dharmas, that are deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise. And what are these dharmas?

There are some recluses and Brahmāns who are speculators about the future who hold settled views about the future, and who on forty-four grounds assert various conceptual theorems referring to the future. Whatever recluses or Brahmāns, are speculators about the future, hold settled views about the future, and assert various conceptual theorems referring to the future, all of them do so on these forty-four grounds, or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none. And owing to what, with reference to what, do these recluses and Brahmāns who are speculators about the future and hold settled views about the future, assert various conceptual theorems referring to the future on forty-four grounds?

Doctrines of Conscious Survival: Views 19–34

There are, monks, some recluses and Brahmāns who maintain a doctrine of conscious survival, and who on sixteen grounds proclaim the self to survive conscious after death. Whatever these recluses or Brahmāns maintain a doctrine of conscious survival, all of them do so on these sixteen grounds, or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none. And owing to what, with reference to what, do these recluses and Brahmāns who maintain a doctrine of conscious survival, on sixteen grounds proclaim the self to survive conscious after death?

Herein, some recluse or Brahmān makes such a statement, holds such a view: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and material. This is true and other sayings are false.’ This is the first case. It is in this way, on the one of sixteen grounds, some recluses and Brahmāns who maintain a doctrine of conscious survival, proclaim the self to survive conscious after death.

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and immaterial. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and both material and immaterial. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and neither material nor immaterial. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and finite. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and infinite. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and both finite and infinite. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and neither finite nor infinite. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and exclusively happy. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and exclusively miserable. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and both happy and miserable. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and neither happy nor miserable. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and of uniform perception. This is true and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and of diversified perception. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and of limited perception. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, conscious, and of boundless perception. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

These are sixteen grounds of view. It is on these sixteen grounds, that those recluses and Brahmāns who maintain a doctrine of conscious survival proclaim the self to survive conscious after death.

This, monks, only the Tathagata understands: These viewpoints, thus grasped, thus insisted on, will lead to such a future destination, to such a state in the world beyond … ’

Doctrines of Unconscious Survival: Views 35–42

There are, monks, other dharmas that are profound, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise. And what are these dharmas?

There are some recluses and Brahmāns who maintain a doctrine of unconscious survival, and who on eight grounds proclaim the self to survive unconscious after death. And owing to what, with reference to what, do these recluses and Brahmāns who maintain a doctrine of unconscious survival on eight grounds proclaim the self to survive unconscious after death?

Herein, some recluse or Brahmān makes such a statement, holds such a view: ‘The self is immutable after death, unconscious, and material. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, unconscious, and immaterial. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, unconscious, and both material and immaterial. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, unconscious, and neither material nor immaterial. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, unconscious, and finite. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, unconscious, and infinite. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, unconscious, and both finite and infinite. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, unconscious, and neither finite nor infinite. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

These are eight grounds of view. It is on these eight grounds that those recluses and Brahmāns who maintain a doctrine of unconscious survival proclaim the self to survive unconscious after death. Whatever these recluses or Brahmāns maintain a doctrine of unconscious survival, all of them do so on these eight grounds, or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none.

This, only the Tathagata understands: ‘These standpoints, thus grasped, thus insisted on, will lead to such a future destination, to such a state in the world beyond … ”

Doctrines of Neither Conscious Nor Unconscious Survival: Views 43–50

There are, monks, other dharmas that are profound, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise. And what are these dharmas?

There are some recluses and Brahmāns who maintain a doctrine of neither conscious nor unconscious survival, and who on eight grounds proclaim the self to survive neither conscious nor unconscious after death. Whatever these recluses or Brahmāns maintain a doctrine of neither conscious nor unconscious survival, all of them do so on these eight grounds, or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none. And owing to what, with reference to what, do these recluses and Brahmāns who maintain a doctrine of neither conscious nor unconscious survival, on eight grounds proclaim the self to survive neither conscious nor unconscious after death?

Herein, some recluse or Brahmān makes such a statement, holds such a view: ‘The self is immutable after death, neither conscious nor unconscious, and material. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, neither conscious nor unconscious, and immaterial. This is true and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, neither conscious nor unconscious, and both material and immaterial. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, neither conscious nor unconscious, and neither material nor immaterial. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, neither conscious nor unconscious, and finite. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, neither conscious nor unconscious, and infinite. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, neither conscious nor unconscious, and both finite and infinite. This is true, and other sayings are false.’

Some say: ‘The self is immutable after death, neither conscious nor unconscious, and neither finite nor infinite. This is true and other sayings are false.’

These are eight grounds of view. It is on these eight grounds, monks, that those recluses and Brahmāns who maintain a doctrine of neither conscious nor unconscious survival proclaim the self to survive neither conscious nor unconscious after death.

This, monks, only the Tathagata understands: ‘These standpoints thus grasped, thus insisted on, will lead to such a future destination, to such a state in the world beyond … ”

(4) Annihilationism: Views 51–57

There are, monks, other dharmas that are profound, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise. And what are these dharmas?

There are some recluses and Brahmāns who are annihilationists, who hold settled views about the future, and who on seven grounds proclaim the annihilation of a living being. Whatever these recluses or Brahmāns who are annihilationists, and who hold settled views about the future, proclaim the annihilation of a living being, all of them do so on these seven grounds, or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none. And owing to what, with reference to what, do these recluses and Brahmāns who are annihilationists, and who hold settled views about the future, proclaim the annihilation of a living being?

Herein, monks, some recluse or Brahmān asserts the following doctrine and view: ‘Since this self has material form; it is composed of the four primary elements and of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind, and originates from father and mother; it is fed by milk; brought up, clothed, and looked after by father and mother; it is annihilated and destroyed, on the dissolution of the body, and does not continue after death; at this point the self is completely annihilated.’ This is the first case.

To him another recluse or Brahmān says: ‘But it is not at that point that the self is completely annihilated. The self is annihilated and destroyed (on the dissolution of the body) in the sensual realm. It is, therefore, at this point the self is completely annihilated.’ This is the second case.

To him another recluse or Brahmān says: ‘But it is not at that point that the self is completely annihilated. The self which is divine, having material form, mind-made, complete all its limbs and organs is annihilated and destroyed (on the dissolution of the body) in the form realm. It is, therefore, at this point the self is completely annihilated.’ (This is the third case).

To him another says: ‘But it is not at that point that the self is completely annihilated. It is at the point of attainment of infinite space in the formless realm where the self is compeletly annihilated and destroyed.’ (This is the fourth case).

To him another says: ‘But it is not at that point that the self is completely annihilated. It is at the point of attainment of infinite consciousness in the formless realm where the self is compeletly annihilated and destroyed.’ (This is the fifth case.)

To him another says: ‘But it is not at that point that the self is completely annihilated. It is at the point of attainment of nothingness in the formless realmpoint of attainment of infinite space in the formless realm where the self is compeletly annihilated and destroyed.’ (This is the sixth case.)

To him another says: ‘But it is not at that point that the self is completely annihilated. It is at the point of attainment of neither perception nor non-perception in the formless realm where the self is compeletly annihilated and destroyed.’ This is the seventh case.

These are seven grounds of view. It is on these seven grounds that those recluses and Brahmāns who are annihilationists proclaim the annihilation of a living being.

This, only the Tathagata understands: ‘These standpoints, thus grasped, thus insisted on, will lead to such a future destination, to such a state in the world beyond … ”

Doctrines of Nirvana Here and Now: Views 58–62

There are, monks, other dharmas that are profound, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise. And what are these dharmas?

There are some recluses and Brahmāns who maintain a doctrine of nirvana here and now, and who on five grounds proclaim for a living being nirvana here and now. Whatever these recluses or Brahmāns proclaim for a living being nirvana here and now, all of them do so on these five grounds, or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none. And owing to what, with reference to what, do these recluses and Brahmāns proclaim for a living being nirvana here and now, on five grounds?

Herein, monks, some recluse or Brahmān asserts the following doctrine or view: ‘When this self is furnished and supplied with the five strands of sense pleasures, revels in them; at this point the self attains nirvana here and now.’ This is the first case.

To him another recluse or Brahmān says thus: ‘But it is not at that point that the self attains nirvana here and now. For what the self attains nirvana here and now is so subtle. That you neither know nor see, but I only know it and see it. When the self, putting away sense pleasure and unwholesome state, enters into and abides in the first jhāna, the state of joy and ease, born of seclusion, accompanied by reflection, accompanied by investigation, at this point the self attains nirvana here and now.’ This is the second case.

To him another recluse or Brahmān says thus: ‘But it is not at that point that the self attains nirvana here and now. For what the self attains nirvana here and now is so subtle. That you neither know nor see, but I only know it and see it. When the self, suppressing both reasoning and investigation, enters into and abides in the second jhāna, the state of joy and ease, born of serenity, without reflection or investigation, a state of elevation of mind, internal calm of heart, at this point the self attains nirvana here and now.’ This is the third case.

To him another recluse or Brahmān says thus: ‘But it is not at that point that the self attains nirvana here and now. For what the self attains nirvana here and now is so subtle. That you neither know nor see, but I only know it and see it. When the self, by absence of the longing after joy remains in equanimity, mindful and self-possessed, and experiences in the body that ease of which the ariyans speak, and so enters into and abides in the third jhāna, at this point the self attains nirvana here and now.’ This is the fourth case.

To him another recluse or Brahmān says thus: ‘But it is not at that point that the self attains nirvana here and now. For what the self attains nirvana here and now is so subtle. That you neither know nor see, but I only know it and see it. When the self, by putting away ease, by putting away pain, by the previous dying away both joys and grieves has entered into and abides in the fourth jhāna—a state made pure by self-possession and equanimity, without pain and without ease, at this point the self attains supreme nirvana here and now.’ This is the fifth case.

It is on these five grounds that those recluses and Brahmāns who maintain a doctrine of nirvana here and now proclaim for a living being nirvana here and now.

This, monks, only the Tathagata understands: ‘These standpoints, thus grasped, thus insisted on, will lead to such a future destination, to such a state in the world beyond … ”

It is on these forty-four grounds, not outside of these, that those recluses and Brahmāns who are speculators about the future and hold settled views about the future, assert various conceptual theorems referring to the future.

This, only the Tathagata understands: These standpoints, thus grasped, thus insisted on, will lead to such a future destination, to such a state in the world beyond …

It is on these sixty-two grounds that those recluses and Brahmāns who are speculators about the past, speculators about the future, and speculators about the past and the future together, who hold settled views about the past and the future, assert various conceptual theorems referring to the past and the future. Whatever recluses or Brahmāns, are speculators about the past, or speculators about the future, or speculators about the past and the future together, hold settled views about the past and the future, and assert various conceptual theorems referring to the past and the future, all of them do so on these sixty-two grounds, or on a certain one of them. Outside of these there is none.

This, only the Tathagata understands: These standpoints, thus grasped, thus insisted on, will lead to such a future destination, to such a state in the world beyond … ”

4. Conclusion

Bhiksus, when those recluses and Brahmāns who are eternalists about the past and hold settled views about the past, proclaim on four grounds the self and the world to be eternal, herefrom those recluses and Brahmāns get knowledge. It is from these, namely, different believing, different desires, different hearings, different conditioning causes, different realizations, different perceptions, different concentrations, and different endurance, that those who get knowledge. Whatever opinion of theirs, is all based only on the personal sensations, feelings. … And when those recluses and Brahmāns who maintain a doctrine of nirvana here and now proclaim on five grounds nirvana here and now for a living being—that too is based only on the personal sensations, feelings.

Therein, when those recluses and Brahmāns who are eternalists proclaim on four grounds the self and the world to be eternal—that is only the feeling of those who do not know and do not see; that is only the agitation and vacillation of those who are immersed in craving. … And when those recluses and Brahmāns who maintain a doctrine of nirvana here and now proclaim on five grounds nirvana here and now for a living being—that too is only the feeling of those who do not know and do not see; that is only the agitation and vacillation of those who are immersed in craving.

Therein, when those recluses and brhmans who are eternalists about the past, and who hold settled views about the past proclaim on four grounds the self and the world to be eternal—that is conditioned by contact. That they can experience that feeling without contact—such a case is impossible. … And when those recluses and Brahmāns who maintain a doctrine of nirvana here and now proclaim on five grounds nirvana here and now for a living being—that too is conditioned by contact. That they can experience that feeling without contact—such a case is impossible.

Whatever recluses or Brahmāns, bhiksus, are speculators about the past, speculators about the future, speculators about the past and the future together, hold settled views about the past and the future, and assert various conceptual theorems referring to the past and the future, all of them, are entrapped in the net of these sixty-two divisions. Whatever this way or that way they plunge about, they are in it. Whatever this way or that way they may flounder, they are included in it, caught in it.

Just as a skillful fisherman should drag a tiny pool of water with a fine-meshed net he might fairly think: ‘Whatever fish or size may be in this pond, every one will be in this net; flounder about as they may, they will be included in it, and caught’—just so is it with these recluses and Brahmāns who are speculators about the past and the future, hold settled views about the past and the future, and assert various conceptual theorems referring to the past and the future, all are entrapped in the net of these sixty-two divisions, flounder as they may, they are included and caught.”

When, monks, a bhiksu understands as they really are the origin and passing away of the six bases of contact, their satisfaction, unsatisfactoriness, and escape from them, then he understands what transcends all these views.

The Tathagata knows himself that the repeated birth and death is no more for him. The body of the Tathagata stands, just for the sake of teaching Dharma to those gods and men. If he stands without the outward form, those gods and men shall have nothing to behold. Just as, when the head of Tala tree has been cut, it can not grow any more—in the same way, having escaped from the cycle of birth and death, the Buddha will not be reborn any more.

As this discourse being spoken by the Buddha, the ten thousandfold world-system shook in six sorts of sake for three times.

When he had thus spoken, the venerable Ānanda, having held a fan fanning the Buddha behind him, coming to the front with one shoulder uncovered, putting his palms together on banded knees, said to the Buddha: “It is wonderful and marvelous! What is the title, Lord, of this exposition of the Dharma?”

The Buddha told him: “ Ānanda, you may remember this exposition of the Dharma as the Atthacara, as the Dharmacara, as the Diṭṭhicara, as the Māracara, and as the Brahmācara.”

On hearing thus, the Buddha spoke, the venerable Ānanda delighted and rejoiced greatly, believed and accepted the teachings.

The fortieth volume of the Dīrghāgama which was spoken by the Buddha.